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THE VEIL THAT COVERED FRANCE’S
EYE:  THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF
RELIGION AND EQUAL TREATMENT
IN IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS
Kendal Davis*
Discrimination based upon religious beliefs and expressions forms the basis for some
of the most serious deprivations of civil and political rights.  The religious beliefs and
expressions that are commonly the ground for discrimination include all of the tradi-
tional faiths and justifications from which norms of responsible conduct—that is,
judgments about right and wrong—are derived.1
[I]f not all, the greater part of the history of humanitarian intervention is the history
of intervention on behalf of persecuted religious minorities.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2008, France’s highest administrative court upheld a decision to
deny citizenship to a Muslim woman because, essentially, she was ‘not French
enough.’3  This decision incited both praise and outrage in the international
human rights arena regarding considerations such as the right to freedom of
religion, gender equality, and citizenship.
In 2000, Faiza Silmi married Karim, a French national of Moroccan
descent, and they moved to France, where the couple had four children.4  Silmi
chose to wear the niqab, a burqa that covers all her body except her eyes, which
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B.A. 2005, Brigham Young University.  I thank Professor Nadine Farid, Assistant Professor
at Gonzaga University School of Law, for suggesting the topic of this Note and Professor
Raquel Aldana, Professor of Law at University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, for
her valuable insight and suggestions.
1 Nathan A. Adams, IV, A Human Rights Imperative:  Extending Religious Liberty Beyond
the Border, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2000) (quoting M.S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN
RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:  THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
HUMAN DIGNITY 653 (1980)).
2 Id. at 22-23 (quoting MANOUCHEHR GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 17 (1962)).
3 Katrin Bennhold, A Veil Closes France’s Door to Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2008,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/19/world/europe/19france.html?_r=1
(discussing the Council of State’s June 27 ruling that Silmi’s ‘‘radical’ practice of Islam was
incompatible with French values like equality of the sexes”).
4 Id.
732
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\10-3\NVJ309.txt unknown Seq: 2 26-OCT-10 12:47
Summer 2010] THE VEIL THAT COVERED FRANCE’S EYE 733
are visible through a narrow slit.5  She wears the niqab because she doesn’t
“like to draw men’s looks” and wants to “belong to [her] husband and [her]
husband only.”6  In 2004, Silmi applied for French citizenship, but France
denied her request a year later because of “insufficient assimilation” into
France.7  A report from a government commissioner to the Council of State
reflected this opinion, it explained that “she leads a life almost of a recluse, cut
off from French society” and “leav[es] the house only to walk with her children
or visit relatives.”8  In her statements to immigration officials, Silmi objected to
the decision, arguing that other immigrants granted French citizenship maintain
“ties with their culture of origin.”9
Specifically, France denied Silmi citizenship because she “has adopted a
radical practice of her religion incompatible with the essential values of the
French community, notably with the principle of equality of the sexes, and
therefore she does not fulfill the conditions of assimilation” which France’s
Civil Code requires for gaining citizenship.10  In an interview following the
ruling, Silmi refuted the notion that she only wears the niqab because she is
following an order from her husband.11  Specifically, Silmi said she “want[s] to
tell them:  It is my choice.  I take care of my children, and I leave the house
when I please.  I have my own car.  I do the shopping on my own.  Yes, I am a
practicing Muslim, I am orthodox.  But is that not my right?”12
Until this decision, France only denied citizenship on the basis of religion
when the government believed applicants were close to fundamental groups.13
The Silmi decision14 received “almost unequivocal support” from political
leaders, such as Fadela Amara, French Minister for Urban Affairs, who called
the niqab “a prison” and “straitjacket.”15  A practicing Muslim, Amara insists
the niqab “is not a religious insignia but the insignia of a totalitarian political
project that promotes inequality between the sexes and is totally lacking in
democracy . . . .”16
This ruling presents potential for problems beyond the headscarf.  As
Mohammed Bechari, President of the National Federation of French Muslims
points out, it is difficult to isolate a beginning or end to labeling radical behav-
ior.17  For example, he questions whether the length of a man’s beard or a man
dressed as a rabbi or a priest could be deemed radical behavior.18  Furthermore,
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 France Denies Citizenship to Muslim Woman in Body Veil, USA TODAY, July 16, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-07-16-France-Muslim_N.htm.
9 Id.
10 Id. (citing the Council of State’s June 27 ruling).
11 Bennhold, supra note 3.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Conseil d’ ´Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], June 27, 2008, decision no. 286798,
Section du contentieux, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriAdmin.do?id
Texte=CETATEXT000019081211.
15 Bennhold, supra note 3.
16 Id.
17 France Denies Citizenship to Muslim Woman in Body Veil, supra note 8.
18 Id.
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M’hammed Henniche, of the Union of Muslim Associations in the Seine-St.-
Denis district north of Paris, fears that the Silmi decision could lead to arbitrary
interpretations of what constitutes “radical” Islam, such as the annual pilgrim-
age to Mecca or daily prayer.19
Certainly, the Silmi decision fueled the already-controversial French head-
scarf affair.  The decision prompts further questions about the separation of
church and state in France, particularly to what lengths the French government
will go to secure its desired interpretation of such separation.  Silmi’s legal
battle is not over.  She is taking her case to the European Court of Human
Rights (“ECHR”).20
This Note examines relevant French domestic law and international
human rights instruments, and argues that while immigration and naturalization
decisions remain an exercise of broad sovereign powers, the emerging human
rights norm to be free from discrimination should apply in naturalization pro-
ceedings.  Furthermore, despite judicial deference and flexibility to party-states,
the Conseil d’ ´Etat’s Silmi decision violated this norm.
Part II provides a legal framework for analyzing the Silmi decision in light
of the emerging human rights norm to be free from discrimination in matters of
immigration and naturalization.  This section examines French constitutional
law, including the significant absence of the plenary power in immigration law
in French jurisprudence.  Part III reviews the historical background of religion
in France, including the country’s history of separation of church and state,
Islam in France, and the recent controversy surrounding women wearing the
headscarf in schools.  Part IV discusses freedom of religion generally, includ-
ing the difficulty of defining religion itself.  Parts V and VI examine freedom
of religion and freedom to manifest religion under international law, respec-
tively, including relevant ECHR precedent.  Part VII discusses relevant non-
binding international instruments.  Finally, Part VIII analyzes the Silmi deci-
sion, concluding that it violates the emerging human rights norm to be free
from discrimination, including on religious grounds, in matters of immigration
and naturalization.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The legal framework for analysis of the Silmi decision includes the French
Constitution, the French judicial system, French legal treatment of immigration
legislation, and France’s international legal obligations.
19 Bennhold, supra note 3.
20 See Lizzie Davies, The Young French Women Fighting to Defend the Full-Face Veil, THE
OBSERVER, Jan. 31, 2010, at 40, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/31/
french-muslim-burqa-veil-niqab.
In order to submit an application to the ECHR, petitioners must first exhaust all domes-
tic remedies as required by European Convention Article 35.  Protocol No. 11 to the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 35, May 11,
1994, 2061 U.N.T.S. Annex A(7) [hereinafter European Convention].  Thus, the disposition
of this case by the Conseil d’ ´Etat, France’s highest administrative court, likely satisfies the
Article 35 requirement.
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a. French Constitution
The French Constitution provides a foundation for analyzing the Silmi
decision as to the country’s domestic treatment of its citizens and its legal hier-
archical treatment of international obligations.  Notably, its constitution states,
“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic.  It
shall ensure equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin,
race, or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.”21
Regarding France’s international obligations, the constitution could more
explicitly detail the treatment of treaties and international instruments in French
domestic legality.22  Article 55 of the Constitution makes the obligations of
international human rights instruments self-executing in France.23  Moreover,
Article 55 establishes such international treaties as superior to French domestic
laws, when conflict exists.24  However, Article 55 explicitly limits the
supremacy of any such instrument “to its publication and to its application by
the other party.”25
Accordingly, this Note considers France’s domestic laws and international
legal obligations as one legal body, rather than two distinct sets of obligations.
France’s constitutional treatment of immigration legislation, which pertains to
both domestic and international obligations, is particularly important.
b. French Court System
This analysis considers the roles of two French judicial bodies—the Con-
seil d’ ´Etat and the Conseil Constitutionnel.  The Conseil d’ ´Etat operates as the
“supreme court of the [French] administrative court system.”26  The court is
both the highest administrative court and performs governmental advisory and
consultative functions.27  The Conseil d’ ´Etat hears cases brought by private
citizens, whereas the Conseil Constitutionnel hears questions brought by gov-
21 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.) translated at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-con-
stitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958/la-constitution-du-4-
octobre-1958.5071.html (follow hyperlink for “version anglaise” for .pdf of English
translation).
22 Martin A. Rogoff, Application of Treaties and the Decisions of International Tribunals in
the United States and France:  Reflections on Recent Practice, 58 ME. L. REV. 406, 435
(2006).
23 1958 Const. art. 55. See also Johan D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Constitutional and International Law, 5 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 321, 373-74 (1991).
24 Fr. Const. art. 55. See also van der Vyver, supra note 23 at 374.
25 Rogoff, supra note 22, at 435 (citation omitted).  Fr. Const. art. 55 (“Treaties or agree-
ments duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament,
subject, with respect to each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party.”).
26 ANDREW WEST ET AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 88 (2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2005)
(1998).
27 Id.  There are six sections of the Conseil d’ ´Etat Constitutionnel—five administrative and
one judicial; each section also has its own president. Id. at 92.  The Prime Minister is the
President of the Conseil d’ ´Etat, but in practice, it is under the Vice President’s control. Id.
RAYMOND YOUNGS, ENGLISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW 78 (2d ed. Rout-
ledge Cavendish 2006) (1998).  Approximately 250 conseillers, maitres des requites, and
auditeurs serve in both the administrative and judicial divisions. Id.  Generally, five judges
hear cases; however, important cases are heard by either thirteen senior conseillers or seven-
teen less senior judges. Id.
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ernment officials.28  While the Conseil d’ ´Etat does not have explicit constitu-
tional powers of judicial review, governments generally defer to its advisory
opinions as authoritative, even in the area of immigration policy.29
The primary purpose of the Conseil Constitutionnel is to rule on the con-
stitutionality of legislation proposed by Parliament or the Government.30  In its
primary judicial function, the Conseil d’Etat operates as a court of cassation by
adjudicating the legality of decisions by lower administrative courts and certain
special administrative jurisdictions.31  Notably, although the Conseil Constitu-
tionnel’s decisions are not legally binding on the Conseil d’ ´Etat, which issued
the Silmi ruling, the Conseil d’ ´Etat recognizes such constitutional interpreta-
tions as binding.32  Thus, both of these courts play a role in judicial review of
French immigration law.
c. Absence of Plenary Power Doctrine of Immigration Law
In United States jurisprudence, the plenary power doctrine of immigration
law grants Congress and the Executive Branch authority to regulate immigra-
tion without judicial review.33  Specifically, the United States Supreme Court
has exempted the federal government’s absolute immigration power from con-
stitutional restraints, including judicial review.34  The Supreme Court secured
this absolute power by establishing the doctrine in the foreign affairs power,
rather than the constitutionally enumerated powers.35  For example, in Chae
Chan Ping v. United States,36 the Supreme Court “held Congress’s power to
pass legislation regulating immigration to be inherent in U.S. sovereignty
. . . .”
37
 There, the Court essentially removed itself from reviewing immigra-
tion legislation38 by stating that “[If Congress] considers the presence of for-
eigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be
dangerous to its peace and security . . . . [I]ts determination is conclusive upon
28 Elisa T. Beller, The Headscarf Affair:  The Conseil d’ ´Etat on the Role of Religion and
Culture in French Society, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 581, 602 (2004).
29 Meredith K. Olafson, Note, The Concept of Limited Sovereignty and the Immigration
Law Plenary Power Doctrine, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 433, 448 (1999).
30 Susan Soltesz, Note, Implications of the Conseil Constitutionnel’s Immigration and Asy-
lum Decision of August 1993, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 265, 269 (1995).  In August
1993, the Conseil Constitutionnel held unconstitutional eight articles of the French Parlia-
ment’s 1993 immigration and asylum laws. Id. at 265.
31 WEST, supra note 26, at 91.
32 Cynthia Vroom, Constitutional Protection of Individual Liberties in France:  The Conseil
Constitutionnel Since 1971, 63 TUL. L. REV. 265, 310, 313-14 (1988).  Although likewise
not legally bound by the Conseil Constitutionnel’s decisions, the Cour de Cassation,
France’s highest court, also recognizes the Conseil Constitutionnel’s decisions as binding.
Id. at 310-11.
33 Olafson, supra note 29, at 433.  In a series of cases throughout the last century, the
United States Supreme Court developed this doctrine “as a largely extraconstitutional theory
of federal legislative authority over immigration.”  Anne E. Pettit, Note, “One Manner of
Law”:  The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and the Immigration Law Plenary Power Doc-
trine, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 173 (1996).
34 Olafson, supra note 29, at 438 (citation omitted).
35 Id. (citation omitted).
36 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
37 Pettit, supra note 33, at 185 (citing Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604.).
38 Id. at 173.
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the judiciary.”39  Despite the court’s extension of certain constitutional protec-
tions to noncitizens, immigration law in the United States remains largely unre-
viewable by the judiciary.40
Other nations view the plenary power doctrine as both contradictory to
present-day international law and in need of adjustment to abide by such law.
Significantly, French constitutional law, unlike the United States’, does not
include a plenary power doctrine of immigration law.  Indeed, the Conseil Con-
stitutionnel regularly reviews the constitutionality of immigration legislation.41
Thus unrestricted by the plenary power doctrine or stare decisis,42 the French
judiciary uses this flexibility to integrate international human rights norms into
its immigration law jurisprudence.43  For example, after extensive judicial
review of immigration legislation, the Conseil Constitutionnel recently
increased the rights of aliens when it invalidated eight provisions of the “Pas-
qua Bill,” policy aimed at zero illegal immigration.44  The Conseil Constitu-
tionnel refused to allow the Parliament unregulated legislative power in
determining alien rights.45  The absence of the plenary power doctrine allows
France to incorporate its international obligations, discussed next, into its immi-
gration law jurisprudence.
d. France’s International Obligations
France is a party to multiple international accords.  Principally, France is a
party to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms (“European Convention”)46 and the International Covenant
39 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
40 See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:  Phan-
tom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990);
Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases:  The “Plenary
Power” Justification for On-going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 14 (2003);
Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous
Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1091 (1995).
41 Soltesz, supra note 30, at 265, 269.  In August 1993, the Conseil Constitutionnel held
unconstitutional eight articles of the French Parliament’s 1993 immigration and asylum laws.
Id. at 265.
42 Although the Conseil Constitutionnel is not bound by its prior decisions, it refers to them
“in order to establish continuity and maintain authority.” Id. at 270.
43 Olafson, supra note 29, at 446.
44 Soltesz, supra note 30, at 265, 285.  The Pasqua Laws forbade foreign graduates from
working in France, denied residency to foreign spouses in France who lived in France ille-
gally prior to marriage, and increased police power to deport illegal immigrants.  Jennifer
Kolstee, Comment, Time for Tough Love:  How France’s Lenient Illegal Immigration Poli-
cies Have Caused Economic Problems Abroad and Social Turmoil Within, 25 PENN ST.
INT’L L. REV. 317, 326 (2006).  The laws also required children of foreign parents born in
France to declare voluntarily their wish to become French citizens, thereby weakening the
family unit. Id. at 326-27.  The Conseil Constitutionnel invalidated the legislation specifi-
cally on French constitutional principles, holding that the eight invalidated articles violated
basic rights guaranteed by the French Constitution, which apply to both foreigners and
French nationals.  Soltesz, supra note 30, at 265, 285-86.
45 See Soltesz, supra note 30, at 310-11.
46 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
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on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).47  The European Convention declares
that the rights and freedoms therein “shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status.”48  Likewise, the ICCPR imposes upon each party to it the
obligation “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the [ICCPR], without distinc-
tion of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”49  Addition-
ally, France is a state party to the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), and thereby “condemn[s] dis-
crimination against women in all its forms.”50  Article 55 of the French Consti-
tution makes these documents binding.51
Furthermore, although they are non-binding resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly, France is subject to the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”)52 and the Declaration on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination on the Basis of Religion or
Belief (“1981 Declaration”).53  The Universal Declaration “recogni[zes] . . . the
inherent dignity and . . . equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family.”54  These rights, pursuant to the Universal Declaration itself,
apply “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, . . .national or
social origin, . . . birth or other status.”55
The broad language of these prohibitions of distinction as to race or
national origin, one would reason, apply to immigrants as well as natural citi-
zens of the state parties to these international accords.  This legal framework, in
conjunction with an understanding of religion in France, provides the backdrop
against which this note analyzes the Silmi decision.
III. A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RELIGION IN FRANCE
France’s treatment of religious issues, specifically pertaining to the Mus-
lim headscarf, finds its base in the French principle of laı¨citeˆ.  This principle,
embedded in the French idea of the proper role of religion, influences both
individual French citizens’ perceptions and the government’s treatment of the
wearing of the Muslim headscarf.
47 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
48 European Convention, supra note 46, art. 14.
49 ICCPR, supra note 47, art. 2(1).
50 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 2,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
51 1958 CONST. art. 55.
52 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
53 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based
on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter
1981 Declaration].
54 Universal Declaration, supra note 52, preamble.
55 Id. art. 2.
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a. Laı¨citeˆ
The French term “laı¨citeˆ” summarizes the widely accepted French belief
about the “proper relationship between religion and the French state.”56  While
the English translation of the term is “secular,” “[t]here is no firm definition of
laı¨citeˆ:  neither officially established nor generally accepted.”57  In a December
2003 speech, then-President Jacques Chirac declared,
laı¨citeˆ is inscribed in our traditions.  It is at the heart of our republican identity. . . . It
is in fidelity to the principle of laı¨citeˆ, the cornerstone of the Republic, the bundle of
our common values of respect, tolerance, and dialogue, to which I call all of the
French to rally.58
Laı¨citeˆ “protects the freedom to believe” by assuring that everyone can express
and practice their faith without intrusion by others, so long as such actions do
not threaten others.59  Perhaps most importantly, as Chirac emphasized, laı¨citeˆ
is imperative to social peace and national unity.60
Although modern descriptions of laı¨citeˆ imply a tolerance and equality
deserving of celebration, history cautions against such a romanticized depiction
of the doctrine.  Scholars such as T. Jeremy Gunn suggest that although the
French may consider laı¨citeˆ to be the essence French values, laı¨citeˆ’s portrayal
as an embodiment of equality, neutrality, and tolerance, is actually a myth.61  In
reality, laı¨citeˆ “emerged from periods of hostility, antagonism, discrimination,
and often violence.”62  Accordingly, in examining laı¨citeˆ in modern context,
the doctrine’s background cautions against an unrealistic vision of these values
as perfect foundations of France’s republic.  Rather, France has sometimes
resorted to using the doctrine of laı¨citeˆ to suppress religious beliefs, such as
those of the Roman Catholic Church, Protestants, Jews, and the Society of
Jesus (Jesuits).63  France’s treatment of its Muslim population is arguably one
such example of this use of laı¨citeˆ.  Thus, a decision like Silmi is not entirely
inconsistent with France’s experience, although this is not to say that these
values do not hold a central place in the country’s tradition.
56 T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laı¨citeˆ:  A Comparison of the United States and
France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 420 (2004).
57 Id. at 420 n.2 (quoting EMILE POULAT, NOTRE LA¨ICIT ˆE PUBLIQUE 116 (2003)).
58 Id. at 428 (quoting Jacques Chirac, President, Republic of France, Speech from the
Elyse´e Palace (Dec. 17, 2003), speech excerpts available at http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/
elysee.fr/anglais_archives/speeches_and_documents/2003/speech_by_jacques_chirac_presi-
dent_of_the_republic_on_respecting_the_principle_of_secularism_in_the_republic-excerpts.
2675.html) [hereinafter “Chirac, Elyse´e Palace Speech”].
59 Chirac, Elyse´e Palace Speech, supra note 58.
60 Id.
61 Gunn, supra note 56, at 442, 452.
62 Id. at 452.
63 See id. at 433-42 (describing two periods of French history during which the modern
French conception of laı¨citeˆ developed).
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b. Islam in France and the European Union
France’s Muslim population is the largest in Europe, and in France, Islam
is the second largest religion after Catholicism.64  Estimates from 2002 found
approximately 4,155,000 Muslims in France, which account for an estimated
7.1% of the French population.65  Specifically, this population comes from the
Maghreb region of North and North-West Africa, including Morocco, Algeria,
and Tunisia, as well as Turkey, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.66
These immigrants, who congregate in suburban areas outside France’s major
cities, are mostly working class or poor.67
Unquestionably, an informed study of the intersection of France and Islam
requires an understanding, if brief, of the headscarf itself.  Fundamentally, the
Koran makes the Islamic practice of women’s covering religiously signifi-
cant.68  This practice varies in validity and degree of covering both in different
countries and among the Muslim women therein.69  Many Islamic scholars
interpret this practice as serving two aims:  to distinguish the genders and “to
control male sexual desire by moderating women’s behavior.”70  However,
these two purposes are subject to many interpretations, such as the view held by
many parties, including non-Muslims, Muslims, secularists, and gender rights
activists, who regard the headscarf as a symbol of gender subordination and
oppression.71  On the other hand, Muslim females in favor of wearing head-
scarves view the headscarf as a sign of prestige, identity, and confidence,
despite societal disfavor.72  For the purposes of this Note it is not necessary to
fully resolve the meaning and implications of the headscarf; it is sufficient to
glean that in Islam the headscarf is “a diverse, contested, and evolving set of
practices both in the larger Muslim world and in France. . . . [and it is more
than a fight against] secularism and gender equality.”73
As a result of the growth of Islam in France, and the increased “appear-
ance of Muslim women wearing the headscarf in public[,]” a suspicion devel-
oped that women who wear the headscarf are “not really French,” preferring
64 Stefanie Walterick, The Prohibition of Muslim Headscarves From French Public Schools
and Controversies Surrounding the Hijab in the Western World, 20 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 251, 254 (2006).
65 Nusrat Choudhury, From the Stasi Commission to the European Court of Human Rights:
L’Affaire du Foulard and the Challenge of Protecting the Rights of Muslim Girls, 16
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 199, 211 (2007) (citing OPEN SOC’Y INST., THE SITUATION OF
MUSLIMS IN FRANCE 74 (2002) (defining Muslim as a “person of Muslim culture”)).  Cur-
rently, French law prohibits identifying citizens based on religious affiliation and the French
Census has not collected data on religious affiliation since 1872. Id. (citing Ste´phanie Giry,
France and Its Muslims, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2006, at 87, 89 (2006)).
66 Id. at 211.
67 Chouki El Hamel, Muslim Diaspora in Western Europe:  The Islamic Headscarf (Hijab),
the Media and Muslims’ Integration in France, 6 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 293, 294 (2002).
68 Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?:
Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 743, 750 (2006).
69 Id.
70 Choudhury, supra note 65, at 217.
71 Id. at 220-21.
72 Id. at 222.  For a discussion of the views of Muslim females in favor of wearing, and in
favor of banning, headscarves, see generally Wing & Smith, supra note 68.
73 Choudhury, supra note 65, at 216.
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their Muslim identity to their French identity.74  As the number of Muslims
grew quickly in France, the headscarf often became a “symbol of a foreign
people—with a foreign religion—who have come to France, but who do not
wish to integrate themselves fully into French life or accept French values.”75
Thus, the French regard the headscarf as a symbol of not only religious, but
also cultural identification.  This French suspicion of organized Islam leads
some French to regard these outward manifestations of religion by students as
“effort[s] to subvert republican values.”76  Even Chirac stated that the French
find it difficult to accept the sort of aggression manifest in wearing a veil and
that secularism excludes such blatant “religious proselytism.”77  The headscarf
controversy underscores this “particularly French sensibility to Islam,” which
other major European countries express to a lesser degree.78
One interpretation of the French suspicion of Muslims considers it a result
of the French ideal of citizenship as one of cultural assimilation, in which pub-
lic life takes precedent over private life.79  Many non-Muslim French disdain
the headscarf as an affront to French cultural homogeneity and an infringement
on the French separation of church and state, questioning “how French” head-
scarf-wearing Muslim women are.80  During the period beginning with the
French Revolution through the late twentieth century, a French model of citi-
zenship emerged that requires citizens actively to don the nation’s culture,
including French language.81  However, a more recent model of French citizen-
ship would welcome as a French citizen anyone willing to take on the French
culture.82  Under this later view, a woman who wears the headscarf could
arguably take on the French culture, yet not to the point of complete cultural
assimilation.
The current controversy may be a result of these varying views.  Specifi-
cally, rather than seeking a sustainable way for Muslims and other French citi-
zens to live together, “mainstream French political intervention, represented by
the reports and the legislation that has been passed—together with the increas-
74 Gunn, supra note 56, at 456.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 457 (quoting TRAITE DE DROIT FRANCAIS DES RELIGIONS 265 (Francis Messner et
al. eds., 2003)).
77 John Henley, Something Aggressive About Veils, Says Chirac, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 6,
2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/06/france.jonhenley (last vis-
ited Mar. 10, 2010).
78 Gunn, supra note 56, at 457 (quoting TRAITE DE DROIT FRANCAIS DES RELIGIONS supra
note 76, at 265).  Several other major European countries appear uninhibited by the same
degree of suspicion of Islam found in France, although this is not to say that these countries
are free from prejudice against Islam.  For example, Germany grants Muslims, the country’s
largest migrant group, many religious freedoms; the German government also assisted in
building mosques.  John D. Snethen, The Crescent and the Union:  Islam Returns to Western
Europe, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 251, 260-61, 264 (2000).  In Austria, where approx-
imately 2.05% of the population is Muslim, the Muslim community has free airtime on
government-owned television, rights of religious education, and an Islamic cemetery. Id. at
261, 264.  Additionally, the United Kingdom allowed Saudi Arabia to build an Islamic
school, available to the country’s one million Muslims. Id. at 260, 265-66.
79 Beller, supra note 28, at 588.
80 Wing & Smith, supra note 68, at 772-73.
81 Beller, supra note 28, at 586.
82 Id.
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ing public and media hostility towards Islam in France—has simply blown the
problem up into one of exaggerated and dangerously unstable proportions.”83
This model of French citizenship adds another dimension to the events leading
up to the headscarf controversy.
i. Gender and the Headscarf84
The headscarf affair presents not only a religious or cultural issue, but a
gender issue as well.  Although this Note examines the headscarf specifically in
the context of freedom of religion, it is necessary to glance briefly at the head-
scarf’s gender implications to fully understand how this religious cloth became
the subject of such controversy in France.
Many observers simply equate the gender difference exhibited by Muslim
women and girls’ wearing the headscarf with gender subordination.85  How-
ever, there are certainly various motivations for women to wear the headscarf;
among them are personal religious conviction, freedom of religion and expres-
sion, acceptance within the religious community, compliance with family val-
ues, protection from harassment, individual choice, and religious/cultural
identity.86  There are also many reasons to oppose wearing the headscarf,
including that it is sexist, a symbol of oppression, that it fosters extremism, and
creates dissension among Muslim women.87
Speaking for Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights, Raja El Wabti
called for France to scrutinize its own practices as critically it does those of
foreign cultures.88  Specifically, El Wabti argued that regardless of one’s opin-
ion about the veil, forcing women to remove it is no better than forcing them to
wear it, “both ways are discriminatory and undemocratic.”89  Regardless of
which view of the headscarf one adopts, understanding both perspectives is
beneficial to this analysis of France’s headscarf controversy, which emerged
against this backdrop of laı¨citeˆ and tensions regarding Muslim women wearing
the headscarf.
c. L’Affaire du Foulard (The Headscarf Controversy)
Certainly, there is a great deal more to the headscarf controversy than
described below.  Although this Note specifically addresses religious discrimi-
nation, the headscarf ban clearly has additional racial and ethnic implications.
83 Id. at 599 (citing ADRIAN FAVELL, PHILOSOPHIES OF INTEGRATION:  IMMIGRATION AND
THE IDEA OF CITIZENSHIP IN FRANCE AND BRITAIN 154 (1998)).
84 For more discussion on the headscarf and gender equality, see generally Karima
Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights:  A Contextual Analysis of Headscarves, Religious
Expression, and Women’s Equality Under International Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
367 (2007); Leora Bilsky, Uniforms and Veils:  What Difference Does a Difference Make?,
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2715 (2009); and Anastasia Vakulenko, Gender Equality as an
Essential French Value:  The Case of Mme M, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143 (2009).
85 Choudhury, supra note 65, at 220.
86 For an explanation of each reason, see Wing & Smith, supra note 68, at 758-66.
87 For an explanation of each reason, see id. at 766-70.
88 Choudhury, supra note 65, at 200 (quoting RAJA EL HABTI, KARAMAH:  MUSLIM WOMEN
LAWYERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LA¨ICIT ˆE, WOMEN’S RIGHTS, AND THE HEADSCARF ISSUE IN
FRANCE 7 (2004), available at http://www.karamah.org/docs/veilpaper.pdf).
89 Id. (quoting RAJA EL HABTI, KARAMAH, supra note 88, at 7).
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Nusrat Choudhury90 encapsulates the various implications of the ban in her
description of the headscarf affair as “an impassioned debate about the integra-
tion of Muslims in France, the influence of political Islam on French soil, gen-
der equality in Muslim communities, and the perceived threat posed by Muslim
girls wearing headscarves in school to laı¨citeˆ.”91  While the following sum-
mary is by no means exhaustive, it is sufficient for an informed discussion of
the issue as it relates to international human rights.
Girls wearing headscarves in French schools, although certainly not a new
issue, caused a particular “national media frenzy” in late 2003.92  The frenzy
began with Prime Minister Raffarin’s comments encouraging headscarf bans in
public schools, as well as then-Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy’s pro-
posal to require women to remove their headscarves in official identification
photographs.93  Additionally, public opinion polling revealed that seventy-two
percent of the French population supported a public school ban on all signs of
religious and political adherence, and fifty-six percent supported a similar ban
in private religious schools.94
In July 2003, then-President Chirac announced the creation of a commis-
sion, which became known as the Stasi Commission, to examine the applicabil-
ity of laı¨citeˆ in France and make suitable recommendations.95  Notably,
although the Commission’s mandate mentioned religious insignia, it did not
specify headscarves or religious clothing.96  The Commission’s Report recom-
mended a public school ban on all “clothing and signs manifesting religious or
political affiliation.”97 According to the Commission, public order justified the
ban:
(1) to respond to the coercion suffered by Muslim girls whose families and communi-
ties force them to wear headscarves against their will (. . .[which] exacerbates sexual
discrimination and religious polarization within France); and (2) to respond to admin-
istrative difficulties suffered by school officials who are forced to implement confus-
ing directives in situations to intense pressure.98
Chirac extolled the report:
In all conscience, I consider that the wearing of clothes or signs which conspicu-
ously denote a religious affiliation must be prohibited at school.
90 Nursat Choudhury is a Staff Attorney in the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
National Security Project, where her work focuses on litigation challenging national security
policies that violate civil rights and civil liberties.  The Paul & Daisy Soros Fellowships for
New Americans, Spring 2004 Fellow, http://www.pdsoros.org/current_fellows/index.cfm/yr/
2004#choudhury (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
91 Choudhury, supra note 65, at 201.
92 Gunn, supra note 56, at 458.
93 Id. at 459.
94 Id. at 422-23 n.6.
95 Choudhury, supra note 65, at 232.  The commission became known as the Stasi Commis-
sion because it was led by Bernard Stasi. Id.
96 Mukul Saxena, The French Headscarf Law and the Right to Manifest Religious Belief, 84
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 765, 776-77 (2007).
97 Gunn, supra note 56, at 462 (quoting RAPPORT AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE, at 68
(2003) [hereinafter Stasi Report]).
98 Stasi Report, supra note 97, at 31.
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Discreet signs, for example a Cross, a Star of David or Hand of Fatima will of
course remain allowed.  On the other hand, . . . . the Islamic veil, . . . the Kippa[99] or
a Cross of a clearly excessive size, have no place in State schools.  State schools will
remain secular.100
On March 15, 2004, Chirac signed the “Headscarf Law” which states that
“[i]n public schools, the wearing of symbols or clothing by which students
conspicuously manifest a religious appearance is forbidden.”101  Subsequently,
the French National Assembly passed the law with 494 votes to 36, and the
French Senate with 276 votes to 20.102  Following the law’s enactment, French
schools expelled forty-eight students who refused to remove their conspicuous
religious insignia.103  Significantly, Chirac never identified the link between
laı¨citeˆ and the religious clothing ban, as though it was so apparent that it
needed no explanation.104  The law essentially forces Muslim girls to choose
between wearing the headscarf and receiving a public education.105
Recent political changes in France indicate that Muslim girls will likely
continue to face this decision.  In the January 2007 presidential election, French
voters elected Nicolas Sarkozy, “an advocate of cultural integration.”106  When
Sarkozy accepted his party’s presidential nomination, he declared that it is
“unacceptable to ‘want to live in France without respecting and loving France
and learning the French language. . . . If you live in France then you respect the
laws and the values of the Republic.’”107  Sarkozy’s election represents the
unlikelihood that French voters will seek to overturn the Headscarf Law.108
There is, arguably, an emerging human rights norm to be free from dis-
crimination, particularly on religious grounds, in immigration and naturaliza-
tion decisions.  However, making this norm a reality is by no means an easy
feat.  The difficulty of making this norm a reality can be understood through a
consideration of the history of religion in France, the recent headscarf affair,
and a brief description of the intricacies of freedom of religion.
99
“Kippa” is another term for the yarmulke, “a skullcap worn in public by Orthodox Jewish
men or during prayer by other Jewish men.” THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY
932, 1946 (2d ed. 2005).
100 Chirac, Elysee Palace Speech, supra note, 58.
101 Choudhury, supra note 65, at 199 (quoting Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal
Official de la Re´publique Franc¸aise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p.
5190).
102 Beller, supra note 28, at 581.
103 French Schools Expel 48 Over Headscarf Ban, EXPATICA, Jan. 20, 2005, http://www.
expatica.com/fr/news/local_news/french-schools-expel-48-over-headscarf-ban-15996_165
01.html.  Expatica is a web site that prints articles from the Agence France-Presse in English.
104 Gunn, supra note 56, at 462-63.
105 Id. at 504.
106 Kathryn Boustead, The French Headscarf Law Before the European Court of Human
Rights, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 167, 169 (2007) (citing Sarkozy Takes French Presi-
dency, BBC NEWS, May 6, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6630797.stm).
107 Id. at 169-70 (quoting Elaine Sciolino, French Governing Party Endorses Sarkozy for
President, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 14, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/
2007/01/14/news/france.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2010)).
108 Id. at 169.
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IV. FREEDOM OF RELIGION GENERALLY
Although freedom of religion is a seemingly simple ideal, translating the
ideal into a guaranteed fulfillment of the freedom is not so simple.  After con-
sidering relevant provisions bearing on the freedom of religion in France, this
section discusses components to the freedom of religion, the difficulty in defin-
ing religion specifically, and the moral argument for this freedom.
a. Freedom of Religion Provisions Under France’s International
Obligations
France is a party to several international human rights agreements that
explicitly guarantee an individual’s right to freedom of religion.109  Most nota-
bly, both Article 9(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Arti-
cle 18 of the Universal Declaration use similar language; the ECHR states that
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”110  Confirm-
ing the extent of these rights, the ECHR held that Article 9 protects “the sphere
of personal beliefs and religious creeds [and] . . . acts which are intimately
linked to those attitudes, such as acts of worship or devotion.”111
Using near-verbatim language, both Article 18 of the ICCPR,112 and the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimina-
tion Based on Religion or Belief (Declaration on Religious Discrimination)
likewise affirm these rights of thought, conscience, and belief.113  Accordingly,
109 Saxena, supra note 90, at 782.  France is a state party to a number of other treaty obliga-
tions that might have an impact upon the freedom of religion and belief in the context of this
Note, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, Convention against Discrimination in Education, and
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Id. at 782-84.
However, for brevity’s sake, this Note does not address these obligations.
110 European Convention, supra note 20, art.9(1).  Article 18 of the Universal Declaration
states: “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.”  Universal Declaration, supra note 52, art. 18.
111 Keturah A. Dunne, Comment, Addressing Religious Intolerance in Europe:  The Limited
Application of Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 117, 130-31 (1999) (quoting Simeon J. Ling, Forty Years
of European Jurisprudence on Religious Freedom:  The European Court of Human Rights
Precedent 1 (Oct. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Rutherford Institute)
(alteration in original)).
112 Article 18 states that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion.  This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or pri-
vate, to manifest his religion in worship, observance, practice and teaching.”  ICCPR, supra
note 47, art.18(1).
113 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance and of Discrimina-
tion Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc A/36/684 (Nov. 25,
1981) [hereinafter Declaration on Religious Discrimination].  This Declaration also prohibits
discrimination on the basis of religion or belief. Id. art. 2(1).
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France has both binding and non-binding obligations to ensure the individual
right to freedom of religion.
b. Two Components to Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is much more than an individual’s right to worship
according to the dictates of their own conscience.  Specifically, freedom of
religion consists of freedom in two components: the forum internum and the
forum externum.114  Firstly, the forum internum represents “the right to enter-
tain a religious belief of one’s choice, and emphasizes the individual’s ability to
profess, maintain, change, have, or adopt a religious belief.”115  The forum
internum relates to an individual’s inner faith and conscience.116  Both the
ICCPR and the Declaration on Religious Discrimination define this freedom as
the “freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice.”117  Secondly,
and distinct from the internum, the forum externum is the freedom to “manifest
. . . religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”118  The
European Convention includes this freedom of the forum externum, with simi-
lar clauses in the Universal Declaration, ICCPR, and Declaration on Religious
Discrimination.119
c. Defining Religion
Fundamentally, a problem inherent in establishing any freedom of religion
or belief is the problem of defining religion itself.  For example, the United
Nations Human Rights Committee adopts a broad definition of religion, “pro-
tect[ing] theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to
profess any religion or belief . . . not limited . . . to traditional religions or to
religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to
those of traditional religions.”120  However, scholars such as Johan van der
Vyver note the difficulties of defining religion and determining the associated
legal rights or obligations.121  Specifically, making a distinction between free-
dom of religion and freedom of belief limits which beliefs the law protects.122
114 Choudhury, supra note 65, at 255 (citing Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie, Women’s Equal Right to
Freedom of Religion or Belief: An Important but Neglected Subject, in RELIGIOUS FUNDA-
MENTALISMS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 117, 119-123 (Courtney W. Howland ed.,
1999)).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 266.
117 ICCPR, supra note 47, art. 18(1).  Likewise, the Declaration on Religious Discrimina-
tion provides that everyone shall have the “freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of
his choice.”  Declaration on Religious Discrimination, supra note 113, at art. 1(1).
118 Choudhury, supra note 66, at 256 (quoting the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Eur. T.S. No. 5).
119 See European Convention, supra note 20, art. 9; Universal Declaration, supra note 52,
art. 18; ICCPR, supra note 47, art. 18(1); Declaration on Religious Discrimination, supra
note 113, art. 1(1).
120 Johan D. van der Vyver, Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief:  International
Law Perspectives, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 505 (2005) (quoting General Comment No.
22, U.N. GAOR, Human Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., 1247 mtg. P2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/
Rev1/Add.4 (1993)).
121 Id. at 503.
122 Id. at 506.
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This limitation results from the fact that most international human rights law
regulates freedom of religion in conjunction with the freedom of belief, thereby
tying the kinds of beliefs protected to religion or those beliefs that have some-
thing in common with religious belief.123  Even this brief glimpse at the diffi-
culty in defining religion provides another basis for the complexities involved
in the Silmi decision and how countries, such as France, may determine what
religious expression to limit, and to what extent.
d. The Moral Argument
The individual right to freedom of religion and belief is more than a right
created by international instruments—it is an inherent right based in morality.
In its preamble, the Universal Declaration refers to “the inherent dignity . . . of
all members of the human family,” and Article 1 states that “[a]ll human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights[ ] . . . and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood.”124  Michael Perry argues that these provi-
sions make clear that “the fundamental conviction at the heart of the morality
of human rights is this:  Each and every (born) human being . . . has inherent
dignity; therefore, no one should deny that any human being has, or treat any
human being as if she lacks, inherent dignity.”125  Specifically, because of this
inherent dignity, we should want the law to protect the right to freedom of
religion because when a government action or policy denies this freedom, it
causes suffering, which infringes on human dignity.126  Therefore, international
law regarding human rights should only give governments the authority to deny
this freedom in situations when such discretion is justified.127
These complexities of defining a concrete right to the freedom of religion
demonstrate the difficulty in applying this right despite its guarantees under
instruments of international law.
V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Quite unequivocally, the international instruments to which France is
obliged recognize and guarantee the freedom of religion or belief.  This analy-
sis focuses primarily on the European Convention, as a binding treaty, and
relevant ECHR precedent.  Additionally, as many view the Universal Declara-
tion as binding because it is customary international law, and the right to relig-
ion is arguably a customary norm, this analysis also considers the Universal
Declaration.  As a parallel United Nations obligation, a brief description of the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimina-
tion Based on Religion or Belief follows.
123 Id.
124 Universal Declaration, supra note 52, pmbl. and art. 1.
125 Michael J. Perry, A Right to Religious Freedom?  The Universality of Human Rights, the
Relativity of Culture, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 385, 388 (2005) (citation omitted).
126 Id. at 410.
127 Id.
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a. European Convention of Human Rights and European Court of Human
Rights
Effective in 1953, the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms aimed to promote the upholding and protecting of human
rights and fundamental freedoms between the Council of Europe’s member
states.128  Specifically, each contracting member state “undertakes that its
domestic law and administrative practices conform to the Convention’s articles
and, where any violation of human rights is held to exist . . . that it will take
positive action to remedy the breach, if necessary by introducing corrective
legislation in its national Parliament.”129  The body charged with the responsi-
bility of enforcing the European Convention is the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR).130  The ECHR has jurisdiction over “all matters concerning
the interpretation and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto
. . . .”
131
 Thus limited to interpreting and applying the European Convention,
the ECHR can only decide whether a member state’s national law is in viola-
tion or not; it cannot force the amendment or revocation of a violating law.132
Of primary importance, Article 9 of the European Convention, which the
ECHR declared to be a foundation of democracy, guarantees freedom of con-
science, belief, and religion.133  Specifically, Article 9(1) guarantees this free-
dom as a right belonging to everyone.134  However, Article 9(2) provides
justifiable limits on the freedom of religious expression, where the restriction is
prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic society.135  Nonetheless, the
ECHR emphasizes the importance of the Article 9 rights:
[F]reedom of . . . religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” [within
the meaning of the Convention] . . . . It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most
vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life,
but it is also a precious asset to atheists, agnostics, skeptics and the unconcerned.
The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won
over the centuries, depends on it.136
Article 9(2) applies expansively through Article 14’s prohibition of discrimina-
tion “on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.”137
128 Dunne, supra note 111, at 128.
129 Boustead, supra note 106, at 171 (quoting Robert Blackburn, The Institutions and
Processes of the Convention, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE:  THE ECHR AND ITS
MEMBER STATES, 1950-2000, at 3, 11 (Robert Blackburn & Jorg Polakiewicz eds., 2001)).
130 Id.
131 European Convention, supra note 20, art. 32(1).
132 Boustead, supra note 106, at 173.
133 Dunne, supra note 111, at 130 (citing Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 17 (1993)).
134 European Convention, supra note 20, art. 9(1).
135 Id. art. 9(2).
136 Carolyn Evans & Christopher A. Thomas, Church-State Relations in the European
Court of Human Rights, 2006 BYU L. REV. 699, 700 (2006) (quoting Kokkinakis v. Greece,
260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1993)).
137 European Convention, supra note 20, art. 14.
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While states have leeway in placing limitations on the manifestation of
religion and belief, the court has made clear that Article 9 places obligations on
the State to guarantee the “peaceful enjoyment” of the Article 9 rights to those
who hold such beliefs.138  However, the court still recognized that those hold-
ing religious beliefs “cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism”
and “must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and
even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith.”139
In order to establish Article 9 interference, the petitioner must establish
that the offended belief reached a “certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohe-
sion and importance.”140  In order to justify interference with religious expres-
sion, the state law in question must be both “adequately accessible” to the
individual and expressed with sufficient detail to enable the petitioner to adjust
his conduct accordingly.141  A state must demonstrate that its action was “pre-
scribed by law” as a form of due process notice requirement.  Despite the
weight the court gives to a government’s legitimate aims, it declares that free-
dom of religious expression is fundamental element of democracy and govern-
ments must encourage religious pluralism.142
Particularly relevant to Silmi, in Dahlab v. Switzerland, the ECHR sug-
gested that gender equality constitutes a legitimate government aim justifying
an Article 9 infringement, stating that the headscarf
appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and
which . . . is hard to square with the principle of gender equality.  It therefore appears
difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of toler-
ance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination . . . .143
The Dahlab ruling implies that a headscarf ban may “protect[ ] the rights and
freedoms of others” because the headscarf communicates and perpetuates gen-
der inequality.144
Furthermore, Protocol 12 of Article 1 states:  “1.  The enjoyment of any
right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other
status.  2.  No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any
ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.”145  Thus, Protocol 12’s
emphasis establishes Article 1 as a right of equality, not only a prohibition.
138 Paul M. Taylor, The Questionable Grounds of Objections to Proselytism and Certain
Other Forms of Religious Expression, 2006 BYU L. REV. 811, 826 (2006) (quoting Otto-
Preminger-Institute v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 47 (1994)).
139 Id.
140 Boustead, supra note 106, at 175 (quoting Peter G. Danchin & Lisa Forman, The Evolv-
ing Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religious
Minorities, in PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN
EUROPE 192, 197 (Peter G. Danchin & Elizabeth A. Cole eds., 2002)).
141 Saxena, supra note 96, at 793 n.176 (citing Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 245, 271 (1979)).
142 Boustead, supra note 106, at 180 (citation omitted).
143 Choudhury, supra note 65, at 272 (citing Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1
(2001)).
144 Id.
145 CLARE OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 430 (4th ed. 2006) (1975).
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France, as a signatory member of the European Convention, is bound to
follow the conditions therein, including Article 9’s religious guarantee.  As the
ECHR enforces the European Convention, in order to analyze properly the
Silmi case, this Note explores relevant ECHR precedent cases regarding free-
dom of religion and religious clothing.
i. ECHR Precedent
In particular, two ECHR precedent cases dealing with religion and specific
legislation provide a useful background for analysis here: Kokkinakis v.
Greece146 and S¸ahin v. Turkey.147  Although these cases do not address immi-
gration law, as discussed above, the absence of a French plenary power doc-
trine of immigration law means that the both French courts and the ECHR may
review such legislation or related decisions.
A. Kokkinakis v. Greece
The first case in which the ECHR found an Article 9 violation was the
seminal case of Kokkinakis v. Greece.148  There, a Jehovah’s Witness couple
visited the wife of the cantor of the local Greek Orthodox church.149  Greece
charged the couple with violating a Greek law that made proselytizing150 a
criminal offense.151  The ECHR unanimously held the law violated Article 9
because it interfered with Kokkinakis’ freedom to manifest his beliefs.152  Spe-
cifically, there was no pressing social need for the law, and the applicants had
not attempted to persuade the householder by any improper means.153
Upon holding that the law constituted an Article 9(1) interference, the
court determined that Article 9(2) prohibited such an interference.154  Although
the court deemed the criminalization “prescribed by law” and accepted the
Greek government’s argument that the law met the legitimate aim of protecting
citizens’ freedoms from “attempts to influence them by immoral and deceitful
means,” the court held that the law was not necessary in a democratic soci-
ety.155  Specifically, Greece failed to establish that a pressing social need justi-
146 Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 25, 1993), http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=kokkinakis%
20—%20v.%20—%20Greece&sessionid=50938253&skin=hudoc-en.
147 S¸ahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 10, 2005) (Grand Chamber),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=
44774/98&sessionid=50938523&skin=hudoc-en.
148 Dunne, supra note 111, at 133.
149 Kokkinakis, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 7 (May 25, 1993).
150 Proselytism is defined as “any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the religious
beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion . . . with the aim of undermining those
beliefs, either by any kind of inducement or promise of an inducement or moral support or
material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by taking advantage of his inexperience, trust,
need, low intellect or naivety.” Id. ¶ 16.
151 Id. ¶¶ 8, 16.
152 Id. ¶ 50.  Kokkinakis complained to the ECH after exhausting all remedies under Greek
law. Id.
153 Id. ¶ 49.
154 Id. ¶¶ 49-50.
155 Kokkinakis, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 41-44, 49 (May 25, 1993).
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fied the measure, and the measure was seemingly disproportionate to the
legitimate aim.156
As it pertains to the rights of conscience, this decision may indicate either
a more broad judicial application, or a treatment of the right of conscience as
“an awkward inconvenience to be tolerated rather than as a matter of funda-
mental importance.”157  Keturah Dunne identifies three weaknesses in the Kok-
kinakis decision.158  First, the ECHR has failed to “require governments to
impose less restrictive burdens on issues of conscience.”159  Rather than find-
ing the anti-proselyting law a per-se Article 9 violation, the ruling suggests that
the ECHR will accept any governmental reasoning for the restriction.160  Sec-
ond, the decision indicates a bias against non-mainstream religions.161  Third,
the court’s distinction between mainstream and other religions reflects a “con-
tinued deference to state-established religions and general unwillingness to ana-
lyze laws that benefit religions favored by the State.”162
Although the Kokkinakis decision did not discuss religious clothing or
symbols, it serves as the foundation of the ECHR’s Article 9 case law which
thereafter developed to include cases dealing with religious clothing and
symbols.
B. S¸ahin v. Turkey
The most relevant ECHR case dealing with conspicuous religious symbols
is S¸ahin v. Turkey.163 S¸ahin considered the University of Istanbul’s policy
prohibiting students in class lectures or exams from wearing head coverings or
having beards.164  The University excluded Leyla S¸ahin, a student who wore a
headscarf out of a personal religious duty, from exams and lectures and pre-
vented any additional class registration.165 S¸ahin filed a complaint with the
Turkish Administrative Court wherein she argued that the University lacked
authority to enact the policy, which she also argued violated her European Con-
vention rights.166  After both the Administrative Court and the Turkish Consti-
tutional Court rejected her complaint, S¸ahin argued before the ECHR that the
university’s action constituted an Article 9 interference.167
The court found no Article 9 violation.  In its review, the court agreed that
the law interfered with S¸ahin’s religious freedom, but found the Headscarf Law
prescribed by law.168  After reviewing the “the circumstances of the case and
156 Id. ¶ 49.
157 Dunne, supra note 111, at 137 (quoting Gunn, supra note 56, at 308).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 138 (citing Gunn, supra note 56, at 325-27).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Boustead, supra note 106, at 182.
164 S¸ahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 16 (Nov. 10, 2005) (Grand Cham-
ber), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&high
light=44774/98&sessionid=50938523&skin=hudoc-en.
165 Id. ¶ 17.
166 Id. ¶ 18.
167 Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
168 Id. ¶¶ 98.
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the terms of the domestic courts’ decisions,” the court accepted the argument
that the law “pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms
of others and of protecting public order . . . .”169  Specifically, the circum-
stances and terms likely refer to the public interest of maintaining Turkey’s
secularism, as the court considered the history and importance of secularism in
Turkey at length.170  Notably, the court did not consider other possible motiva-
tions for the law, such as the suppression of traditional Muslim practices, which
motivations would likely undermine Turkey’s argument or arguably invalidate
any case for a legitimate aim.171
In regards to whether the law was necessary in a democratic society, the
Turkish government argued that in order to self-preserve, the state must be able
to enforce secularism strictly.172  Questioning the link between secularism and
the headscarf ban, S¸ahin argued that headscarves did not present a threat to the
university’s educational atmosphere because religious discrimination is less
likely among reasonable adults.173  Citing “extremist political movements”174
in Turkey, the ECHR agreed with the Turkish government and declared that
strictly enforcing secularism is necessary to a democratic society:
[t]he Court considers this notion of secularism to be consistent with the values under-
pinning the Convention.  It finds that upholding that principle, which is undoubtedly
one of the fundamental principles of the Turkish State which are in harmony with the
rule of law and respect for human rights, may be considered necessary to protect the
democratic system in Turkey.  An attitude which fails to respect that principle . . .
will not enjoy the protection of Article 9 of the Convention.175
Reflecting the relationship between each element present in the French head-
scarf controversy—religious expression, gender equality, and infringement on
others’ rights—the court referred to secularism as “promoting sexual equality
and avoiding confrontations between practicing and non-practicing
Muslims.”176
Moreover, the court recognized the need to control dangerous fundamental
movements and protect public order.  Specifically, because a majority of Tur-
key’s population belongs to a specific religion, Article 9(2) provides justifica-
tion for measures designed to prevent fundamentalist movements from
pressuring students.177  Thus, in that light, universities “may regulate manifes-
tation of the rites and symbols of the said religion . . . with the aim of ensuring
169 Id. ¶ 99.
170 Id. ¶ 114. See also id. ¶104-111 (discussing secularism and government more
generally).
171 Boustead, supra note 106, at 185.
172 S¸ahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 71, 103 (Nov. 10, 2005) (Grand
Chamber), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&
highlight=44774/98&sessionid=50938523&skin=hudoc-en.
173 Id. ¶ 101.
174 Id. ¶ 115 (quoting S¸ahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 109 (June 29,
2004) (Chamber)).
175 Id. ¶ 114.
176 Boustead, supra note 106, at 186-87 (citing S¸ahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶ 115 (Nov. 10, 2005) (Grand Chamber)).
177 Id. at 194 (citing S¸ahin (Fourth Sec.) at ¶ 99).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\10-3\NVJ309.txt unknown Seq: 22 26-OCT-10 12:47
Summer 2010] THE VEIL THAT COVERED FRANCE’S EYE 753
peaceful co-existence between students of various faiths and thus protecting
public order and the beliefs of others.”178
Although both S¸ahin and Kokkinakis involve government legislation, the
cases indicate the ways in which the ECHR treats Article 9 considerations,
relevant to this analysis of Silmi.  Specifically, both cases reflect the ECHR’s
inclination to accept member states’ arguments about what constitutes a legiti-
mate aim, even where ulterior illegitimate motives, such as religious suppres-
sion, may also exist.
b. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the United Nations
in 1948, is the principal basis for global human rights standards, referenced in
nearly every international human rights instrument.179  Certainly, the Universal
Declaration is one of the four major international documents to “universalize[ ]
the principle of religious freedom.”180  The Declaration’s preamble, which pro-
vides an explanation as to why the drafters enumerated the specific rights
therein, “reflect[s] the basic human rights philosophies of our times.”181
Emphasizing the Universal Declaration’s correlation to the U.N. Charter, the
preamble cites the Charter’s preambular statement that its purpose is “to reaf-
firm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small
. . . .”
182
 Fittingly, the Declaration’s preamble reflects this purpose:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world. . .[and] the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed
their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person
and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom . . . [and] Member States have
pledged themselves to achieve . . . the promotion of universal respect for and obser-
vance of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . .183
Despite the importance of the Universal Declaration in propounding a list of
fundamental human rights and freedoms, including religious freedoms, the doc-
ument is a General Assembly resolution, which has no binding legal force
under the U.N. Charter.184  Therefore, while the Universal Declaration holds
itself as the “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
178 Id. (citing S¸ahin (Fourth Sec.) at ¶ 99).
179 Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National
and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 290 (1995/1996).
180 Derek H. Davis, The Evolution of Religious Freedom as a Universal Human Right:
Examining the Role of the 1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms
of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 2002 BYU L. REV. 217,
224 (2002).
181 Johannes van Aggelen, The Preamble of the United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights, 28 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 129, 131-32 (2000).
182 Id. at 133 (citing U.N. Charter, 2d preambular para.).
183 Universal Declaration, supra note 52, pmbl.
184 Carolyn Evans, Time for a Treaty?  The Legal Sufficiency of the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination, 2007 BYU L. REV. 617, 621-22
(2007).
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nations,”185 it did not take steps to ensure the protection of its enumerated
rights by imposing a legal obligation.186
Article 18 is the key text of the Universal Declaration: “[e]veryone has the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes free-
dom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teach-
ing, practice, worship and observance.”187  This broad category of the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, or the forum internum, includes
the right to profess a religion or no religion at all.188  In regards to Article 18’s
use of the term “belief,” there is a strong argument to interpret strictly “belief”
in connection with “religion,” which it follows twice in Article 18.189  Accord-
ingly, “belief” in the context of Article 18 excludes political, economic and
other beliefs.190
Importantly, Article 2 guarantees the Universal Declaration’s rights to
“[e]veryone . . . without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.”191
The rights to entertain, change, and manifest a particular religious or other
belief, as well as the other rights set forth in the Universal Declaration, are now
universal international law.192Accordingly, United Nations member states
arguably have an obligation to recognize and protect the rights espoused in the
Universal Declaration, including the right to freedom of religion or belief, hav-
ing pledged to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.193
c. United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief
Globally considered to propound “the fundamental rights of freedom of
religion and belief,”194 the 1981 declaration represents “the international com-
munity’s present understanding of the minimum standard for matters of relig-
ious rights.”195  Although non-binding, it implies an expectation that state’s
will adhere to its proclamations, as do all U.N. General Assembly
declarations.196
185 Universal Declaration, supra note 52, pmbl.
186 Evans, supra note 184, at 622.
187 Universal Declaration, supra note 52, art. 18.
188 Natan Lerner, The Nature and Minimum Standards of Freedom of Religion or Belief,
2000 BYU L. REV. 905, 911 (2000).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Universal Declaration, supra note 52, art. 2.
192 Hannum, supra note 179, at 327.
193 Id. at 324-27.
194 Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Decla-
ration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 AM. J. INT’L L.
487, 488 (July 1988) (quoting U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/44/Add2, at 1 (statement by the
United States Government).
195 Lerner, supra note 188, at 921.
196 Id. at 918.
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Perhaps significantly, the 1981 Declaration does not ascribe precise mean-
ing to the terms “discrimination” and “intolerance.”197  Specifically, the docu-
ment “gives both words equivalent meaning”198 and omits provisions relating
to religiously based intolerance or discrimination.199  Thus, the 1981 Declara-
tion’s prohibition on discrimination is arguably vague because not every prefer-
ence based on religion or belief is discriminatory.200
Most significantly, Article 1 guarantees the freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion, which includes the right to manifest such religion or
belief in observance or practice.201  Supporting this freedom, Article 2 estab-
lishes a rule that “[n]o one shall be subject to discrimination by any State,
institution, group of persons or person on the grounds of religion or belief.”202
Further, Article 6 establishes a thorough list of rights to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion.  This list includes the rights to:
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish
and maintain places for these purposes;”203
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian
institutions;”204
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and
materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;”205
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;”206
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;207
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individu-
als and institutions”;”208
(g) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance
with the precepts of one’s religion or belief;”209
(h) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in
matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels.”210
Similarly to the ICCPR, the 1981 Declaration makes a distinction between
the basic rights of the forum internum—thought, conscience and religion—and
the forum externum—worship, observance, practice, and teaching.211  Despite
these guarantees, it is unclear exactly what constitutes the right to change one’s
religion or belief, as the Declaration does not specifically address apostates and
heretics.212  However, for the purpose of this Note, the 1981 Declaration pro-
197 Id. at 919.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 919-20.
201 1981 Declaration, supra note 53, art. 1.
202 Id. art. 2.
203 Id. art. 6(a).
204 Id. art. 6(b).
205 Id. art. 6(c).
206 Id. art. 6(d).
207 Id. art. 6(e).
208 Id. art. 6(f).
209 Id. art. 6(h).
210 Id. art. 6(i).
211 Lerner, supra note 188, at 920.
212 Sullivan, supra note 194, at 495-96.
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tects an individual’s right to manifest a religious belief through religious cloth-
ing, subject only to limitations discussed infra.213
These three international instruments, to which France is a party, obligate
France to ensure the realization of the right to freedom of religion or belief, not
only for its own citizens, but for everyone, which includes immigrants by
implication.
VI. FREEDOM TO MANIFEST ONE’S RELIGION OR BELIEF
Indeed, as discussed supra, international instruments provide for the free-
dom to manifest one’s religion or belief both in public and in private.  This
includes assurances such as the Universal Declaration’s guarantee of the free-
dom in community with others, in public, and within the circle of those whose
faith one shares.214  Importantly, however, the freedom to manifest one’s relig-
ion or belief is not an absolute right.215
a. Limitations on Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief
In addition to the general limitation that “[e]veryone has duties to the com-
munity in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possi-
ble[,]”216 there are specific limitations on the exercise of individual rights and
freedoms.217  Each of the international instruments discussed in this Note
simultaneously recognize limitations and protections on the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion.218
Most significant, as a binding treaty on France, Article 9(2) of the Euro-
pean Convention permits limitation on the freedom to manifest religious beliefs
in circumstances where the government can prove that the restriction is pre-
scribed by law and considered necessary in a democratic society.219  A govern-
ment’s aim is legitimate if the interference with religious freedom is “in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or
for the protection of rights and freedoms of others.”220  A member state’s abil-
ity to enforce such legally-sanctioned limitations is not without boundary, as
the ECHR has declared that such restrictions “‘call for very strict scrutiny’
because [they] have a direct impact on ‘the need to secure true religious plural-
ism, an inherent feature of the notion of a democratic society.’”221
213 This uncertainty as to what constitutes the right to change one’s religion or belief is
discussed in the context of proselytism by Tad Stahnke in Proselytism and the Freedom to
Change Religion in International Human Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251 (1999).
214 Universal Declaration, supra note 52, art. 18.
215 Van der Vyver, supra note 120, at 501.
216 Universal Declaration, supra note 52, art. 29(1).
217 Van der Vyver, supra note 120, at 501-02.
218 See, e.g., id. at 501-03.
219 European Convention, supra note 20, art. 9(2).
220 Id.  For a discussion of legitimate aims under Article 9(2) in ECHR case law, see Javier
Martinez-Torro´n, Limitations on Religious Freedom in the Case Law of the European Court
of Human Rights, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 587, 602-05 (2005).
221 Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes:  Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of
Rights in International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, 264 (2008) (quoting Manoussakis v.
Greece, App. No. 18748/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, 407 (1997)).
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Furthermore, the Universal Declaration prohibits the exercise of any of the
rights and freedoms that oppose the United Nations’ principles and purposes,
and disavows any activity or act intended to undermine the Declaration’s rights
and freedoms.222  Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration states that:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recogni-
tion and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just require-
ments of morality, public order, and the general welfare in a democratic society.223
Following suit, other international human rights instruments allow restraints on
the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in order to protect other human
rights and societal interests.  The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms
of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, using nearly
verbatim language, allows for limitations for the same necessities.224  Addition-
ally, the ICCPR likewise repeats and legally sanctions these limitations.225
Similarly to the ECHR, the United Nations Human Rights Committee recog-
nized that these limitations call for strict interpretation, to prevent the destruc-
tion of the right to manifest religion or belief.226
Accordingly, the right to manifest one’s religion or belief is not absolute,
but restricted by sanctioned limitations where appropriate under the circum-
stances.  This exception complicates the headscarf affair.  Thus, it is not purely
an issue of freedom of religion, but also of manifesting that religion.
VII. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Several additional international human rights instruments underscore the
customary international law norm to the right of freedom from religious
discrimination.
a. Non-binding Documents
France is also a signatory to the Concluding Document of the Vienna
Meeting 1986 of the Representatives of the Participating States of the Confer-
ence on Security and Co-operation in Europe (“Concluding Document”).227
The Concluding Document guarantees “the freedom of the individual to profess
and practice religion or belief,” and it strives “to prevent and eliminate discrim-
ination against individuals or communities, on the grounds of religion or belief
222 Van der Vyver, supra note 120, at 501-02.
223 Universal Declaration, supra note 52, art. 29(2).
224 1981 Declaration, supra note 53, art. 1(3).
225 ICCPR, supra note 47, art. 18(3).
226 Danchin, supra note 221, at 264 (quoting U.N. Human Rights Comm., Gen. cmt. No. 22,
¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (Sept. 27, 1993)).
227 Nathaniel Stinnett, Defining Away Religious Freedom in Europe:  How Four Democra-
cies Get Away With Discriminating Against Minority Religions, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 429, 443 (2005) (citing Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Conclud-
ing Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 of Representatives of the Participating States of
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions
of the Final Act Relating to the Follow-up to the Conference, 28 I.L.M. 527 (1989), availa-
ble at http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1989/01/16059_en.pdf [hereinafter Concluding
Document].
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. . . .”
228
 However, the Concluding Document is not self-executing and there-
fore France is not legally bound to its principles.229  In order for this document
to be formally binding on France, France must take the steps necessary to give
it legal status.230
b. Women’s Rights
The 1967 version of the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women231 stated that “[d]iscrimination against women, denying or
limiting as it does their equality of rights with men, is fundamentally unjust and
constitutes an offence against human dignity.”232  Under CEDAW, discrimina-
tion against women shall mean:
[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women,
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural,
civil or any other field.233
The purpose of this definition of discrimination is “to empower the Convention
to be effective to liberate women to maximize their individual and collective
potentialities, and not merely to be brought to the same level of protection of
rights that men enjoy.”234  The inclusion of “all forms” in CEDAW’s title
reflects the Convention’s comprehensive intent by recognizing not only spe-
cific inequalities against women, but also other forms of discrimination “woven
into the social fabric.”235
Notably, CEDAW makes no reference to “religion,” “belief,” or “expres-
sion.”236  Nusrat Choudhury suggests that CEDAW does not call for granting
women the same right to religious belief and expression as men because of the
“perception that secularism is associated with gender equality and religious
expression is associated with gender inequality.”237  Although CEDAW does
not expressly declare the rights of females to religious belief and expression,
two CEDAW provisions condemn beliefs and practices that oppose gender
equality norms, including those religiously based.238  Specifically, Article 2(f)
requires that states “take all appropriate measures . . . to modify or abolish
existing . . . customs and practices which constitute discrimination against
women.”239  Additionally, Article 5(a) requires that states “modify the social
228 Id. at 442-43 (quoting Concluding Document, supra note 227, princs. 16, 16a).
229 Id. at 442-43.  Moreover, the Concluding Document fails to define religion or belief.
Concluding Document, supra note 227, princs. 16, 16a.
230 Davis, supra note 180, at 227.
231 Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 2263
(XXII), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/6880 (Nov. 7, 1967).
232 Id. art. 1.
233 CEDAW, supra note 50, art. 1.
234 Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 643, 670 (1990).
235 Id.
236 Choudhury, supra note 65, at 260.
237 Id. at 261.
238 Id.
239 CEDAW, supra note 50, art. 2(f).
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and cultural patterns . . . which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles . . . .”240  Choudhury
posits that these broad provisions reflect the priority the drafters gave the pre-
vention of oppressing women within religious communities above the protec-
tion of women’s free exercise of religious rights.241
Reporting on France’s CEDAW implementation, the Coordination Fran-
caise pour le Lobby Europe´en des Femmes (CLEF), “alluded to the ‘sexist’
traditions and ‘religious’ practices of minority communities” that subject girls
to both inequality and coercion in school.242  CLEF specifically asked that the
CEDAW Committee implore the French government to alert such communities
to the gender equality ensured by French law and that such equality supersedes
custom.243  Although it did not refer to CLEF’s report, the CEDAW Committee
asked France ‘“to take effective measures to eliminate discrimination against
immigrant, refugee and minority women, both in society at large and in their
communities,’ and ‘to sensitize the community to combat patriarchal attitudes
and stereotyping of roles.’”244  As of 2007, CEDAW had not taken a position
on the issue of headscarves and human rights.245
Based upon the foregoing explanations of the legal framework for analy-
sis, the history of religion in France, freedom of religion, limitations on the
manifestation of freedom or religion, and France’s international human rights
obligations, the following section analyzes the Silmi decision in light of the
emerging human rights norm to be free from discrimination, particularly on
religious grounds, in immigration and naturalization decisions.
VIII. ANALYSIS:  THE SILMI DECISION AS A VIOLATION OF THE EMERGING
HUMAN RIGHTS NORM TO BE FREE FROM DISCRIMINATION,
PARTICULARLY ON RELIGIOUS GROUNDS, IN MATTERS
OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
Although there is an emerging norm in customary international human
rights law to be free from discrimination in immigration and naturalization
decisions, particularly on religious grounds, such decisions remains broad sov-
ereign exercises of power.  Despite judicial deference and flexibility to party-
states, France’s recent decision in Silmi to deny citizenship to a Muslim
woman, violated this norm.
This emerging norm, which finds its basis in the European Convention
Article 9’s guarantee of freedom of conscience, belief, and religion, is binding
240 Id. art. 5(a).
241 Choudhury, supra note 65, at 261.
242 Id. at 263.
243 Id. at 263 (quoting Coordination Franc¸aise pour le Lobby Europe´en des Femmes Con-
vention sur l’ ´Elimination de Toutes les Formes de Discrimination a l’ ´Egard des Femmes,
Contre Rapport sur la France 8 [French Coalition for the European Women’s Lobby, Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Report on
France] [hereinafter CLEF’s Report] (2003)).
244 Id. at 264 (quoting U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Combined Third and Fourth Report and Fifth Periodic Report of France, 12, U.N. Doc. A/
58/38 (July 3, 2003)).
245 Id.
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on France.246  Article 9 applies expansively through Article 14’s prohibition of
discrimination “on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.”247  Although Article 9 does not
explicitly mention immigrants, Article 9(1)’s248 guarantee of this freedom as a
right belonging to everyone implies that immigrants also enjoy this right to
freedom of religion.
Although the Silmi decision likely violates this emerging norm, the legal-
ity of the French headscarf law will likely stand.  Relying on S¸ahin as prece-
dent, Kathryn Boustead predicts that the ECHR is unlikely to find an Article 9
violation in the French Headscarf Law.249  Specifically, France could justify
the law as requisite to a legitimate government aim—maintaining public order
and protecting others’ rights.250  Boulstead argues that “the ECHR would
almost certainly conclude that the [law] is a justifiable interference” on Article
9’s religious freedoms partly due to the court’s broad margin of appreciation
for upholding laı¨citeˆ.251  Even if the headscarf law is an attempt to force inte-
gration, the proposed objectives nevertheless would be acceptable to the
ECHR, which generally disregards a state’s “less acceptable motivations.”252
Despite such a prediction of the headscarf ban’s legality, France’s action
may violate the emerging human rights because requiring France’s desired
extent of assimilation may take too harsh a stance.  According to the ECHR, the
European Convention is a “‘living instrument which must be interpreted in the
light of present day conditions.’”253  To determine whether an action violates
the European Convention, the ECHR looks for “common European stan-
dards.”254  In making this determination, the ECHR relies on its own case law,
domestic law, and international or European instruments, including human
rights treaties.255  Where there is no general agreement on a specific issue, the
ECHR generally defers to the state.256  The ECHR also interprets human rights
treaties based on the principle of effectiveness:  a method of statutory interpre-
tation that requires the interpretation of Convention provisions “make its safe-
guards practical and effective.”257  By applying this principle, the European
Convention’s protections are effective; however, effectiveness cannot add to
the list of protected rights or to state’s obligations.258
246 Dunne, supra note 111, at 130.
247 European Convention, supra note 20, art. 14.
248 Id. art. 9(1).
249 Boustead, supra note 106, at 196.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L., Winter 2003, at 95, 126 (quoting Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1,
para. 31 (1978)).
254 Id. at 126.
255 Id. at 126, 129.
256 Id. at 126.
257 Id. at 127 (quoting Loizidou v. Turkey, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, para. 72 (1995) (Prelimi-
nary Objections)).
258 Id. at 128.
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Specifically, two ECHR methods of interpretation are most relevant to this
Note’s analysis.  First, the ECHR considers relevant rules of international law
and interprets the European Convention in accordance with international law
principles, when possible.259  Second, the ECHR strives to harmonize its judg-
ments with the text of human rights bodies and their treaties.260  Under such an
analysis, the European Convention would not statically apply to immigration,
but account for changes in circumstances.261  Therefore, this analysis supports
the emerging right to be free from discrimination in immigration and naturali-
zation proceedings, and immigration as a whole, that are certainly different
circumstances than existed at the drafting of the European Convention.
Importantly, the ECHR allows a “margin of appreciation,” which doctrine
grants party-states latitude to interpret the rights established in the European
Convention.262  There are two primary elements to this doctrine—judicial def-
erence and normative flexibility.263  First, the ECHR should grant party-states a
“degree of deference and respect their discretion on the manner of executing
their international law obligations.”264  Second, individual states may make dif-
ferent lawful decisions in applying the same international norm.265  This differ-
ential exists because the international norms that are subject to the doctrine are
unresolved and therefore “provide limited conduct-guidance and preserve a sig-
nificant ‘zone of legality’ within which states are free to operate.”266  Although
the ECHR would grant France this margin of appreciation in interpreting its
application of Article 9 rights, the ECHR’s regard for freedom of religion as a
foundation of democratic society would likely strongly counter France’s inter-
pretation.  Specifically, although this international human rights norm is
unresolved, France has arguably exceeded this zone of legality, causing the
ECHR to overturn S¸ahin.
Although Kokkinakis did not deal with immigration, in holding that the
Greek law was not necessary in a democratic society, the ECHR indicated that
it could invalidate Silmi’s citizenship denial along similar reasoning, such as
rejecting France’s insistency upon assimilation.  However, while Kokkinakis
provides a basis for opposing France’s action, S¸ahin provides similar reasoning
for upholding the denial of citizenship.  There, the ECHR found that secularism
was necessary to a democratic society and thus any argument France would
make on secular or laı¨citeˆ grounds could prevail.
Moreover, as detailed supra, the Universal Declaration preamble recog-
nizes “the inherent dignity and . . . equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family . . . .”267  Although the Universal Declaration does not
259 Id.
260 Id. at 129.
261 See id. at 126 (discussing the European Convention as a living instrument that cannot
remain static).
262 Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 701, 723 n.91 (2005).
263 Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 909-10 (2005).
264 Id. at 910.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Universal Declaration, supra note 52, pmbl.
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explicitly mention immigrants, Article 2’s expansive language and the Univer-
sal Declaration’s specific attention to issues that relate to immigrants’ situations
provide a foundation for applying the Universal Declaration to immigrants.268
The Silmi decision is likely contradictory to France’s international obligations
given France’s obligation to recognize and protect the right to freedom of relig-
ion or belief,269 and the Universal Declaration’s status as universal interna-
tional law,270 the rights of which arguably apply to immigrants.  This
contradiction stands despite France’s arguable use of permissible limitations on
the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief.
Accordingly, in light of France’s international human rights obligations to
various instruments guaranteeing the right to freedom of religion to all persons,
the Silmi decision has violated international human rights norms.  Although
national security and permissible limitations weigh against the more expansive
interpretation of freedom of religion or belief, insufficient assimilation, appar-
ently rooted in French suspicion of Islam, will likely not prevail.  Given
France’s history of separation of church and state, and what the French govern-
ment may argue is a strong tension between Muslim and non-Muslim commu-
nities, this decision appears to be a blatant disregard for the international
human right guarantee of freedom of religion in immigration and naturalization
proceedings, in pursuit of the country’s desired cultural assimilation.  It does
not seem necessary to protect the public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.
IX. CONCLUSION
The international human rights documents discussed in this Note evidence
an emerging human rights norm to be free from discrimination, particularly on
religious grounds, which should apply in matters of immigration and naturali-
zation.  This right may best be described by repeating Article 18 of the Univer-
sal Declaration:  “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and free-
dom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and
observance.”271
The French government’s decision, upheld by the country’s highest
administrative court, to deny Silmi citizenship likely constitutes a violation of
this emerging norm by discriminating on religious grounds in immigration and
naturalization proceedings.  Further, this case may represent a dangerous threat
to the freedom of religion and religious manifestation, if the French govern-
ment applies the rationale of cultural assimilation, or not being “French
enough,” beyond this particular headscarf controversy.
268 Monica Nigh Smith, Note, “France for the French?” The Europeans? The Cauca-
sians?:  The Latest French Immigration Reform and the Attempts at Justifying Its Dispropor-
tionate Impact on Non-White Immigrants, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1107,
1134 (2005).  The UDHR addresses the right to an open and fair hearing, to freedom of
movement, and to a nationality.  Universal Declaration, supra note 52, arts. 10, 13, 15.
269 See supra Part V.b (discussing Article 18 of the Universal Declaration).
270 See supra Part V.b (discussing the Universal Declaration).
271 Universal Declaration, supra note 52, art. 18.
